From Thought to Modality: A Theoretical Framework for Analysing Structural-Conceptual Metaphors and Image Metaphors in Film

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Abstract (E): This article sets out to discuss the subject matter of conceptual metaphor in film. The first section provides the reader with a theoretical framework for analysing conceptual metaphor in film. In particular we want to shed light on the following questions: how can a metaphor be identified? What is the difference between a structural-conceptual metaphor and an image metaphor? What are the modes in which the metaphor can manifest itself? What is a visual metaphor and how does it differ from a filmic metaphor? In dealing with these questions, we shall offer the reader a classification of six features, which can be helpful to identify and interpret metaphor in film. In the second section we shall validate these considerations by subjecting them to an empirical discussion. We shall first analyse two examples of structural-conceptual metaphors in film, followed by a discussion of monomodal and multimodal manifestations of image metaphors. Finally, we shall demonstrate their interaction by showing how image metaphors can help activate other structural-conceptual metaphors.

Abstract (F): Cet article concerne la métaphore conceptuelle au cinéma. La première partie offre un cadre théorique pour analyser la métaphore conceptuelle. En particulier, nous cherchons à formuler des réponses aux questions suivantes : Comment la métaphore peut-elle être identifiée ? Quelle est la différence entre une métaphore structurelle-conceptuelle et une métaphore imagée (en anglais : image metaphor) ? Dans quels modes la métaphore peut-elle se manifester ? Qu'est-ce une métaphore visuelle et comment diffère-t-elle d'une métaphore filmique ? En répondant à ces questions, nous offrirons au lecteur une taxinomie de six aspects qui peuvent être utiles pour identifier et interpréter la métaphore au cinéma. Dans la deuxième partie nous appliquerons ces observations à une discussion empirique. Nous analyserons d'abord deux exemples de métaphores structurelles-conceptuelles au cinéma, suivis par une discussion au sujet de versions monomodales et multimodales de métaphores imagées. Enfin, nous montrerons leur interaction en indiquant comment des métaphores imagées peuvent aider à activer d'autres métaphores structurelles-conceptuelles.
**Keywords:** filmic metaphor, conceptual metaphor, image metaphor, monomodal and multimodal metaphor

**Conceptual metaphors: from verbal to visual and multimodal**

Since Lakoff and Johnson’s groundbreaking study *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) metaphors are overall considered as a fundamental feature of our mind. Metaphor is not just a matter of language, but primarily a matter of thought. If metaphors were to be confined only to the realm of language then each verbal metaphor should be unique. The expression “Your claims are indefensible” should differ in a significant way from sentences such as “I demolished his argument” or “He attacked every weak point in my argument”. For Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4-5), however, these expressions do not contain separate and independent metaphors for they belong to the same conceptual metaphor, namely: ARGUMENT IS WAR. As such conceptual metaphors are reflected in our everyday language. The concept is metaphorically structured and therefore the language is as well. Metaphors are only in a derivative way linked to words, or to quote Richards (1965: 94): “Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom.”

If this belief, put forward by the cognitive metaphor theory (CMT), is correct and metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and not language, then it is plausible to assume, as Forceville (2009) rightly does, that there exist other manifestations of conceptual metaphor. Indeed, if conceptual metaphor is not restricted to the realm of language alone, it should manifest itself also through other (non-verbal) modes of communication, such as pictures, music, sound and body language. The unity is preserved for the conceptual metaphor and not for the way in which the conceptual metaphor is presented. For this reason Forceville (2009: 24) adopted the new concept of multimodal metaphor. In contrast to monomodal metaphors, such as the prototypical verbal metaphor, multimodal metaphors are “metaphors whose target and source are each represented exclusively or predominantly in different modes.”

Oddly enough, little attention has been paid to non-verbal and multimodal types of metaphor. Although recent studies show an increase of interest in the visual mode of metaphor (Whittock 1990; Kaplan 1992; Carroll 1996; El Refaie 2003; Fahlenbrach 2008; Ortiz 2011), the main academic interest has been and still is to a large extent the monomodal

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1 In cognitive metaphor theory it is common to use small capital letters to indicate that these particular wordings are not a matter of language, but of concepts, belonging to the realm of human thought. These concepts are underlying the very nature of our daily metaphorical expressions (linguistic or otherwise).
verbal one. With the exception of a few studies (Eggertsson and Forceville 2009; Rohdin 2009), multimodal metaphor has yet to be explored empirically.

This article sets out to discuss the subject matter of conceptual metaphor in film. The first section provides the reader with a theoretical framework for analysing conceptual metaphor in film. In particular we want to shed light on the following questions: how can a metaphor be identified? What is the difference between a structural-conceptual metaphor and an image metaphor? What are the modes in which the metaphor can manifest itself? What is a visual metaphor and how does it differ from a filmic metaphor? In dealing with these questions, we shall offer the reader a classification of six features, which can be helpful to identify and interpret metaphor in film. Finally, we shall demonstrate these reflections by subjecting them to an empirical discussion.

The identification and interpretation of metaphor: A theoretical framework

In the field of cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphor is usually described as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain or to put it simply: A IS B. B is called the source domain which is used to describe and structure the target domain A. In the example from above the concept of WAR is used as a source domain to understand the target domain ARGUMENT. Between A and B exist further a set of correspondences which are often referred to as mappings, whereby elements of the source domain are mapped onto elements of the target domain. In the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR we see the person we are arguing with as an opponent and the talking itself as a battle where we defend our own positions and attack the others. To sum up, Forceville (2002: 2-3) suggests then that the following three questions should be capable of being answered in order to identify something as a metaphor:

1. Which are the two terms of the metaphor, and how do we know?
2. Which is the metaphor’s target domain, which is the metaphor’s source domain, and how do we know?
3. Which features can/should be mapped from the source domain to the target domain, and how is their selection decided upon?

The first two questions deal with the identification of the metaphor, the third concerns the interpretation. Because the metaphor can vary on a number of occasions, we shall further distinguish six features: type (structural-conceptual vs. image), quality (abstract vs. concrete), modality (monomodality vs. multimodality), direction (symmetry vs. asymmetry), spatiality...
(homospatiality vs. non-homospatiality) and reality (filmic vs. ante-filmic). The first four traits are common to all metaphor, whereas the last two are specific for metaphor in film.

**Type.** In addition to conceptual metaphors, which are mainly discussed in cognitive literature, there exist also more short-lived metaphors which involve not the mapping of conceptual *domains*, but rather the mapping of *images*. These metaphors which map conventional mental images onto other conventional mental images by virtue of their internal structure are referred to as *image metaphors* (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff 1993; Gibbs and Bogdonovich 1999). Gleason (2009: 437) in his article on the visual experience of image metaphor prefers a more general approach and describes it as “a metaphor that connects a concrete object to another concrete object”. As such he avoids the assumption of visualisation which accordingly to Gleason is inherent in Lakoff’s definition. In this paper we shall use the term mental image in a broad sense, including not only visual imagery, but also aural images as in “I imagined that I heard the bell”. As such image metaphors are not restricted to one sense. Although recent work (Deignan 2007) seems to indicate that image metaphors can be extended to everyday conventional language, examples are usually taken from literature and poetry. Consider for example the following idiosyncratic sentence from a poem by André Breton which Lakoff and Turner (1989: 90) use to illustrate the image metaphor: “My wife…whose waist is an hourglass”. In this case we have two mental images, one being that of an hourglass, the other being that of a woman, where we map the middle of the hourglass onto the waist of the woman. Image metaphors such as these differ from conceptual metaphors in two fundamental ways (Deignan 2007: 175). Firstly, because target and source refer to concrete things (i.e., things which are directly accessible to the senses), image metaphors concern strong tangible imagery. This differs from such conceptual metaphors as ARGUMENT IS WAR or LIFE IS JOURNEY which may not easily be visualised due to their lack of detail and texture. Secondly, image metaphors are more specific in their extension and scope than conceptual metaphors. Because they are rich in imagistic detail (rather than in knowledge and inferential structure), image metaphors are restricted in their application. They only map onto a single topic, rather than onto a domain or class of topics (Deignan 2007: 176). In a similar way then Grady (1999) considers image metaphors to be one kind of “resemblance” metaphor, because they are grounded in a single resemblance between source and target. In the example from Breton only one aspect or resemblance (i.e., the shape of an hourglass) is mapped onto the form of a woman. In contrast conceptual metaphors such as WAR IS ARGUMENT (which Grady labels “correlation” metaphors) are
grounded in a set of multiple metaphorical extensions and correspondences, rather than in a single resemblance.

Nonetheless, image metaphors share one essential feature with conceptual metaphors: they are conceptual in nature. As with conventional metaphor the locus of the image metaphor is not in the modality (verbal or otherwise), but in the way we conceptualize one mental image in terms of another. Image metaphors are conceptual as well as imagistic. This is because the reader still has to use additional textual knowledge to figure out which part of the image (i.e., that of an hourglass) is mapped. The modality (i.e., the words) only instigates us to perform a mapping from one conventional image to another at the conceptual level. It does not tell us which portion of the hourglass is mapped onto or corresponds with the waist of the woman. Because the term ‘conceptual’ is usually equated with structural generic-level metaphors only, we shall therefore make a small rhetorical adjustment (after all the term ‘conceptual’ applies to image metaphors as well). Following Deignan (2007: 175) correlation metaphors such as WAR IS ARGUMENT, which are believed to structure our thinking and are characterised by rich inferential structure, will be referred to in this paper as ‘structural-conceptual metaphors’.

Image metaphors and structural-conceptual metaphors are however not mutually exclusive. As Lakoff and Turner (1989: 8, 92) suggest, image metaphors can also trigger structural-conceptual metaphors. This idea will be further illustrated during our analysis.

**Quality.** Another important question we have to ask ourselves is whether the source and target domain of the metaphor present itself as concrete or abstract. As already suggested, image metaphors always conceptualize the concrete in terms of the concrete. After all, the very notion of ‘image’ implies concreteness. Target domains from structural-conceptual metaphors, however, are generally labelled as abstract or diffuse. Common target domains therefore often deal with such complicated issues as emotions, morality, time, human relationships, etc. Domains which, due to their lack of clear demarcation, are difficult to grasp and consequently cry out for metaphorical conceptualization. Source domains on the contrary are usually described as concrete, which means that they are directly accessible to the senses. Their comprehensible delineation is used to understand the abstractness of the target domains. Common source domains are the human body, machines and tools, health and illness, light and darkness, etc.² As Forceville (2009: 28) points out the source domain’s concreteness has in CMT been traditionally described in terms of knowledge from our daily physical

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² For a further elaboration on these and other common source and target domains, see Kövecses (2002).
experiences with the world. Other authors, however, have emphasized the influential role of culture (Yu 1998; Kövecses 2005) and history (Blumenberg 1998) in characterising these concrete source domains. As Westra (2010: 128) argues by referring to Blumenberg’s metaphorology, we should avoid the temptation to reduce all metaphors to the sphere of embodiment: “Both approaches (embodiment and the cultural/historical dimension) can, and even should be, viewed as complementary for an overall theory of metaphor; after all, human beings are, to use Cassirer’s term ‘symbolic animals’; i.e., embodied animals subject to evolution and cultural beings caught up in the flow of history; and metaphor is one of the basic ways in which we try to make sense of this specifically human experience – from its very sources: body and spirit.”

Modality. The modality deals with the question as to how the metaphorical thought (structural-conceptual or image) manifest itself to our senses. With no claim to exhaustiveness Forceville (2009: 23-24) categorises nine different modes of depiction: pictorial signs, written signs, spoken signs, gestures, sounds, music, smells, tastes and touch. Using this as a starting point, he further makes the distinction between two kinds of metaphor: monomodal and multimodal metaphors. The first are metaphors “whose target and source are exclusively or predominantly rendered in one mode”. Examples are the prototypical verbal metaphor (which used to be labelled metaphor tout court) and the pictorial or visual metaphor. In both cases source and target domain are rendered in one mode, respectively written signs and pictorial signs. By contrast, multimodal metaphors are “metaphors whose terms are each represented exclusively or predominantly in different modes”. To illustrate this distinction let us consider an example from Buster Keaton’s The Paleface (1922). In this short film, while Buster is running away from a group of Native Americans, the image metaphor ARROW IS RAIN DROP is rendered in more than one mode. The target domain is depicted visually: as spectator we see an arrow flying through the air and falling into the ground. By contrast the source domain – the raindrop which is visually absent from the screen – is cued by a simple gesture of the body: Buster who is simultaneously reaching his hand out in the air, checking whether or not it is raining. By a simple sign of the hand the arrow is thus metaphorically converted into a drop of rain. In the same sense Noël Carroll (1991: 30-33) refers to mimed metaphors. However, because the target domain is still depicted visually, we prefer to use the term visual-mimed metaphors instead. Because the metaphoricity is not in the modality, but in some conceptual mapping, the same image metaphor of the type CONCRETE IS CONCRETE could have been cued monomodally as well by using a visual metaphor. Keaton could for instance have triggered both domains visually by juxtaposing or superimposing an arrow and a raindrop.
The relationship between the conceptual level on the one hand and the content of the representation or the mode on the other can be further described in two ways: direct or *denotative* and indirect or *connotative*. By denotative we mean the expression of its first meaning. In Keaton’s example the image of an arrow directly refers to the concept of an ARROW. By contrast the gesture of the body only indirectly or connotatively refers to the mental image of a RAINDROP. As for structural-conceptual metaphors there can be only one mode for depicting the abstract target domain directly (i.e., the verbal mode). For example, the target domain of TIME can be represented by the word “time”. Language (spoken or written signs) is, by virtue of its symbolic and arbitrary nature, the only mode being capable of rendering the abstract and generic quality of the target domain. Consequently, the target domain of a structural-conceptual metaphor, if present, is usually depicted indirectly or connotatively by means of a metonymy. The abstract target domain DEATH can for example be triggered by the concrete mental image of a GRAVE (as a metonymy for DEATH), which, contrary to the abstract target domain, can in turn be rendered directly by a visual representation of a grave or the word “grave” (see also Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 8). Contrary to metaphor, metonymy only involves one conceptual domain. One entity in a schema (i.e., grave) is taken as standing for one other entity in the same schema, or for the schema as a whole (i.e., the schema of death as a whole). (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 103).

**Direction.** A fourth question concerns the reversibility or symmetry of source and target domain. Can we flip the order of both terms? As for the cognitive paradigm of Lakoff and Johnson and the verbal mode of metaphor the answer is clear: target and source are non-reversible. While it is common to use terms from the war to describe aspects of debate, it is not common to use argument to clarify war. On the part of non-verbal metaphor however there seems to be some confusion. Carroll (1996) on the one hand claims that pictorial metaphors are more liable to symmetry than verbal ones. To support his view, he cites examples from mainly surrealist paintings, like Magritte’s *Le Viol*, which presents the spectator with a unification of a female face and torso. Forceville (2002) on the other hand, backed by his own findings in the field of advertising, denounced this dictum by saying that these examples are rather atypical when considering prototypical examples of what in general can be labelled pictorial metaphor. As we shall see, our article seems to back the latter view.

**Spatiality.** The notion of spatiality entails the question whether or not both terms of the metaphor are simultaneously rendered in one spatial bounded entity (see also Carroll 1996). Because verbal metaphors rely on grammatical structures to serve as clear metaphorical identifiers using the copula of the verb ‘to be’, spatiality only concerns non-verbal metaphors.
If both terms appear simultaneously without any intervention of montage, we speak of homospatiality. By contrast, if the identification is based on montage or decoupage, and thus breaking the spatial unity between source and target domain, we use the term non-homospatiality. Consider for example Eisenstein’s notion of dialectic montage, in which conceptual metaphor emerges from the opposition of two conflicting strings of images. A typical example of this would be the scene in *Strike* (Sergei Eisenstein, 1925) in which the massacre of workers is intercut with the slaughter of a bull (thus evoking the metaphor WORKERS ARE SLAUGHTER-CATTLE).

*Reality*. Finally, where film is concerned, it is useful to make an analytic distinction between two levels of reality where the metaphor can be located. First, there is the level of antefilmic (or primary) reality. It encompasses everything that took place before the camera during the process of filming. It can be further distinguished into two sublevels: afilmic and profilmic (see also Souriau 1951). The afilmic reality exists independently of the film. The profilmic reality is photographed by the movie camera. Both levels are exterior to the filmic (or secondary) level of reality, which is the antefilmic reality as transformed by the exclusive capacities of the cinematic medium. This includes such specific cinematic stylistic devices as montage or editing, superimposition and cinematography (see also Rohdin 2009). The main question is then the following: is the filmic level of substantial importance in order to identify the metaphor? In the formerly cited example from *The Paleface*, the filmic reality barely influences the identification of the metaphor. After all, this metaphor could equally well be identified in the primary reality. The film does not provide any information that an unmediated or direct experience of the metaphor would not have provided. The cinematic medium makes possible a vivid representation of the metaphor, but the metaphor is not specifically cinematic in a deep sense. Because the metaphor is not triggered by any filmic transformation of the primary reality, one could argue that this form comes close to the (mimetic) vision of the French film theorist André Bazin (see also Rohdin 2009: 418). By contrast, in the example from *Strike*, the montage is essential to provoke the metaphor. In this case a specific cinematic device actively interferes in the antefilmic reality in order to communicate the metaphorical mapping to the spectator. Because the filmic level is essential to identify the metaphor, we shall call this a filmic metaphor, which, however, is not the same as a visual metaphor. As was pointed out earlier, a visual metaphor is a metaphor whose target and source are both represented visually. Thus, a metaphor can be visual without being filmic (and vice versa). The terms are not mutually interchangeable. The example from *Strike* is
visual (both the workers and the slaughtering-cattle are depicted visually) as well as filmic (the montage is an essential condition for the realisation of the metaphor).

We are now able to extend the list from above with the following three questions:

4. Are we dealing with an image metaphor or structural-conceptual metaphor?
5. Is the image or structural-conceptual metaphor presented in a mono- or multimodal way and in which modes are both terms depicted?
6. Does the metaphor come into being by the intervention of a filmic parameter? In other words, can we speak of a filmic metaphor?

In the next section we shall try to demonstrate the empirical value of these theoretical reflections by subjecting them to a discussion in film. First we shall provide the reader with an analysis of two structural-conceptual metaphors in film, followed by a discussion of image metaphors. Finally, we shall show how image metaphors can help activate other structural-conceptual metaphors.

**Structural-conceptual metaphors in film**

Whenever reasoning about abstract notions such as time, argument or love it is inevitable to come across the inability to verify these concepts to our senses. After all, these concepts lack an objective validity outside the world of the subject. This raises the following problematic question: how can we discuss what we have never seen or touched before? One way to bridge this gap is to understand the abstract target domain metaphorically in terms of a richer, more experience-based source domain (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Gibbs 1994, 1996; Boroditsky, Ramscar and Frank 2002). It is one of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) most central claims that metaphor is a fundamental mechanism of our mind that enables us to make use of empirical knowledge in order to structure various and often abstract domains. As both Johnson (1987, 2005) and Lakoff (1987) argue, human beings recruit structures of their sensory-motor experience (so called *image schemas*) for abstract conceptualisation and reasoning. Metaphorical extensions such as “I pile up evidence”, “amass facts”, and “build up a weighty argument”, have Johnson (1987: 89) led to write of the target domain BALANCE OF RATIONAL ARGUMENT being structured by the image of PHYSICAL BALANCE. As such, embodied experience plays a crucial role in abstract concepts and in our reasoning with them. Image schemas are important because “they make it possible for us to use the structure of sensory and motor operations to understand abstract concepts and to draw inferences about them” (Johnson 2005: 24). A problem in CMT, however, is that the existence of image schemas is almost solely based on verbal manifestations (see also Forceville 2011; Forceville
and Jeulink 2011). To validate the assertion that people recruit image schemas such as the Balance schema to express abstract meaning, it is essential that non-verbal modalities are taken into account.

Following Forceville and other authors (Buckland 2000; Branigan 2003, 2006) we shall examine the existence of image schemas in film. We shall argue that filmmakers, in order to communicate abstract meaning to the viewer, often resort to such patterns of sensory-motor experience. In particular we shall demonstrate by means of two filmic examples how structures belonging to our sensory-motor experience are metaphorically extended to come to grip with such abstract notions as time and psychological content.

Example 1: TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT
The first example considers a fragment from Professione: Reporter (The Passenger, Michelangelo Antonioni, 1975) and describes the moment when David Locke (Jack Nicholson) exchanges his identity for that of the deceased arms dealer Robertson (Charles Mulvehill). In this scene a long sequence shot allows the horizontal movement of the mobile camera to function as a possible solution to the problem of initiating a flashback. The film shows Locke sitting at a table. This image takes place in the present. The camera then moves horizontally from the right to the left compared to the character. As a result, the past is revealed from the left edge of the screen, pushing away the present towards the off screen space. The past is presented as a discussion between Locke and Robertson. Moving again to the present, the opposite process takes place. The camera moves from left to right along the characters. The present reveals itself again from the right edge of the screen, thus moving away the past to the left. This literally pushes the past discussion out of the frame. The temporal order is restored. The image is occupied with the present: the protagonist sitting at his table.

In this example the concept of time is structured by the Source-Path-Goal image schema. As Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1993) have shown, this schema is one of the most fundamental structures in human thinking. It manifests itself most literally in movement: a person moves from one initial state A (source or starting point) via a trajectory C (action sequence) to another final state B (goal or endpoint). As Forceville (2011: 282) points out, the prototypical movement is walking, “an ability that depends on the human body possessing two legs permitting motion – typically forward motion – as well as on certain motor skills”. By extension the flashback in Professione: Reporter can be analysed as follows: the camera moves horizontally from one location A (the present) via a trajectory C towards another
location B (the past) and back again from B to A. Note that because the movement is horizontal, the left-right orientation is metaphorically extended as well. The left side of the room coincides with the past, the right side with the present. As such patterns of our sensory-motor experience are metaphorically extended to structure our reasoning about time (see also Boroditsky 2000; Gentner 2001). Because the conceptual metaphor TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, also richly discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Gentner and Imai (1992), depends on a filmic parameter (i.e., the movement of the camera), we are dealing with a filmic metaphor.

Example 2: MENTAL RELATIONSHIP IS A SPATIAL RELATIONSHIP

The second example describes a number of significant images from Martha (1974), Fassbinder’s sadomasochistic portrait of a bourgeois marriage between house tyrant and engineer Helmut (Karlheinz Böhm) and his obsequious, fragile wife Martha (Margit Carstensen). Following a scene where Martha aroused Helmut’s dissatisfaction once more by listening to Donizetti instead of Orlando Di Lasso, the two characters are positioned back-to-back in an 18th century canapé confident (a composite canapé with two seats along both sides of the back). The film subsequently shows a tightly framed composition with the image of Martha’s flabbergasted face in the front right and in the left, against the back of the canapé, Helmut’s backside. They are positioned to each other as two separated entities, thus evoking the conceptual metaphor PSYCHOLOGICAL DIVISION BETWEEN TWO PERSONS IS SPATIAL DIVERGENCE OF TWO ENTITIES. She is not yet reshaped in the image of her husband. Things get worse when she also announces she has no interest in the statics of weirs, leading to a hard cut, after which Helmut furiously storms out. Later in the film – when the dialectic of master and slave finds its apotheosis in Martha’s willing submission to her husband’s wishes – the canapé scene is repeated, but this time the visual form is driven by harmony and unification. The scene opens on a wide shot of the two main characters, depicted back-to-back in a perfectly symmetrical profile. While Di Lasso’s glorious music is playing, the camera then turns 90 degrees to the left, halting on Helmut’s face, which now corresponds directly to Martha’s backside while she cites a number of paragraphs on weir technology. The two entities overlap and are conjoined into one by the meticulous framing (MARTHA IS HELMUT or PSYCHOLOGICAL UNITY BETWEEN TWO PERSONS IS SPATIAL CONVERGENCE OF TWO ENTITIES). The mental submission (abstract) takes place through spatial integration (concrete). In both cases then, the image schema of physical divergence and convergence gives rise to structures for ordering our experience of so-called psychological realities. As Johnson (1987: 88) puts it: “The ‘mental’ is understood in terms of the ‘physical’.” Although there is symmetry to be
found in the form, there is none in the metaphor. The manipulation is not mutual. Projections occur from the man to the woman, not vice versa. Because the camera work (in particular the angle) is necessary to initiate the metaphor, we can speak of a filmic metaphor.

**Image metaphors in film**

In addition to the conceptual metaphor, film offers numerous examples of image metaphors. Contrary to structural-conceptual metaphors they are not used to understand the abstract in terms of the concrete. We shall analyse four examples: one monomodal image metaphor (i.e., visual) and three cases of multimodal image metaphors (i.e., visual-mimed, sound-mimed and visual-music).

*Visual image metaphor.* In this category both target and source domain are represented visually. We already mentioned the example from *Strike*, which also was a filmic metaphor. Let us consider an example taken from Tati’s *Playtime* (1967). In one scene Monsieur Hulot is invited to watch television with an old army friend who owns a transparent glass house. At one point, the film offers a symmetrical composed image, displaying Monsieur Hulot and his friend in the living room in the left half of the screen and an identical scene of the neighbours in the right half, separated by a wall. Both groups of people are watching television in the direction of the vertical axis in the centre of the image. As the lower border of the screen runs parallel to the horizontal lines of the transparent glass building, it becomes impossible to see the television sets which were seen earlier in separate asymmetrical shots. This makes it seem as though the characters are not watching the television, but each other, thus forming the visual metaphor *WATCHING TV IS WATCHING THE NEIGHBOURS*. Because a filmic parameter (the specific camera angle) introduces the metaphor, we can speak of a filmic visual image metaphor.

*Visual-mimed image metaphor.* As the term already suggests, target and source are represented visually and through mime respectively. We have already cited Buster Keaton’s *The Paleface*, but also Charlie Chaplin offers us some useful illustrations. Think for example of the infamous scene from *The Gold Rush* (1925) in which Chaplin consumes a clearly visible shoe as a meal. In a similar way then humour arises by means of a visual-mimed image metaphor. The shoe is visually displayed while the concept of a meal is rendered by pantomime.

*Sound-mimed image metaphor.* In this category, target and source manifest itself through sound and mime, respectively. In *Les Vacances de Monsieur Hulot* (Jacques Tati, 1952) there is a scene where the defective car of Monsieur Hulot starts moving down without
a driver but with Martine and her aunt on the back seat. The road bends left, but the car moves straight through the gate to the entranceway of a castle. The horn of the car is secured on the spare tyre that now hangs loose and causes the horn to go off every time the rotating tyre touches the ground. This sound accompanies the next shot, showing the lord of the castle in a wheelchair on the balcony aiming for some birds with a gun. The quacking sound of the car horn is mistaken for the sound of a duck and he starts shooting. In this example, the mistake is revealed only to the viewer, while the lord of the castle remains in the dark. The sound of the horn is heard while the sound of the ducks is not. The presence of the ducks is merely suggested by the physical behaviour of the lord of the castle, whose intention is to kill some birds.

*Visual-music image metaphor.* In this category, target and source domain are depicted visually resp. musically. In a particular scene from *Prénom Carmen* (Jean-Luc Godard, 1983), the film offers an image of restless sea waves. The waves roll from the left to the right, as if obeying the wind’s command. The tireless voice of the sea is not heard, however, as it is replaced by a passage from Beethoven’s String Quarter No.15 in A minor, Op. 132. The rhythm of the music interacts with the visual rhythm of the waves. This sound is not causally connected to that which is depicted in the shot. It is merely a multimodal evocation of the metaphor sea waves are music. The source domain is aural (the music) whereas the target domain is depicted visually (the waves). The mapping occurs from the source domain to the target domain and not vice versa. It is the music that provides the imagery with new meaning. As the sea and the music are simultaneously rendered in one spatial bounded entity, we can speak of homospatiality. Since editing was needed to achieve this metaphor, we are once more dealing with a filmic metaphor.

**Image metaphors as triggers for structural-conceptual metaphors**

At first sight, image metaphors could often be dismissed as banal and insignificant due to their lack of rich knowledge and rich inferential structure. However, as Lakoff and Johnson (1989: 8) have pointed out, these image metaphors can in turn be the trigger for other structural-conceptual metaphors. To demonstrate this, we shall analyse a scene from *Bad Timing* (1980), Nicolas Roeg’s filmic exploration of a destructive love relationship between a psychoanalyst named Alex (Art Garfunkel) and a young woman named Milena (Theresa Russell). In this film the structural-conceptual metaphor love is death, which is not a conventional metaphor but an idiosyncratic and poetic one, is activated by a cluster of image metaphors. The film shows us a montage of images where the fragmented and copulated
bodies of Alex and Mila are repetitiously confronted with a series of clinical shots of Milena in coma, while undergoing a tracheotomy, followed by the insertion of a speculum. Thus the target domain love is understood in terms of the source domain death. This mapping from one domain onto another is laid down in front of the viewer by means of a monomodal sound image metaphor and a series of visual image metaphors. The sound of pain is mapped onto the sound of ecstasy. The operation table (“death bed”), as part of the hospital, resonates in the bed, as part of the sleeping room. Milena’s closed eyes in coma are mirrored in her exoteric facial expression during the act of love. Movement in one scene reverberates in the other, while the penetration is intercut with the intersection of the speculum. Put together, it gives us the following overview:

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<tr>
<th>Scene in the hospital</th>
<th>Scene in the bedroom</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source Domain</strong></td>
<td><strong>Target Domain</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THANATOS</td>
<td>EROS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source Image</strong></td>
<td><strong>Target Image</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATING TABLE (DEATH BED) (visual) =&gt; BED (LOVE BED) (visual)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLOSED EYES (COMA) (visual) =&gt; CLOSED EYES (ECSTASY) (visual)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPLYING SPECULUM (visual) =&gt; PENETRATION (visual)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHOES OF PAIN (sound) =&gt; ECHOES OF ECSTASY (sound)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTILITY OF CORPOREAL EXPRESSIONS (visual) =&gt; TACTILITY OF OPERATION (visual)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the units of each vertical or paradigmatic cluster are clearly different from each other, they nevertheless have something in common. The structural-conceptual metaphor embodies this generality. As the audiovisual images of pain, the closed eyes, the clinical environment are all metonymically associated with death and the tactile images of ecstasy and bodily warmth are associated with love, the juxtaposition of these images activates a conceptual and syntagmatic relationship between death and love, and hence it activates the metaphor love is death. As such, the mapping from one cluster of images onto another cluster of images constitutes a new conceptual metaphor. Because montage is vital to initiate the mappings between the two domains we can further speak of a filmic metaphor.
**Concluding remarks**

This article provides the reader with a theoretical framework for analysing image metaphors and structural-conceptual metaphors in film. In doing so, we have distinguished six features or tools which can be helpful to identify metaphor in film: *type* (structural-conceptual vs. image), *quality* (abstract vs. concrete), *modality* (monomodality vs. multimodality), *direction* (symmetry vs. asymmetry), *spatiality* (homospatiality vs. non-homospatiality) and *reality* (filmic vs. ante-filmic). This was followed by an analysis in film. Firstly, we examined two examples of structural-image metaphors. Following Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of embodied mind, we argued that filmmakers often resort to patterns of sensory-motor experience (so called images schemata) to understand abstract concepts and to perform abstract reasoning. Secondly, we analysed four cases of image metaphors: one case of monomodal image metaphor (i.e., visual) and three cases of multimodal image metaphors (i.e., visual-mimed, sound-mimed and visual-music). Contrary to structural-conceptual metaphors, these metaphors do not structure the abstract in terms of the concrete, but the concrete in terms of the concrete. We have concluded by demonstrating the possibility of their interaction by showing that image metaphors can in turn be the trigger for other structural-conceptual metaphors.

**Bibliography**


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